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Abstract
Auction theory traditionally assumes that bidders’ valuation distributions are known to the auction-
eer, such as in the celebrated, revenue-optimal Myerson auction [Myerson, 1981]. However, this theory
does not describe how the auctioneer comes to possess this information. Recently, Cole and Roughgarden
[2014] showed that an approximation based on a finite sample of independent draws from each bidder’s
distribution is sufficient to produce a near-optimal auction. In this work, we consider the problem of
learning bidders’ valuation distributions from much weaker forms of observations. Specifically, we con-
sider a setting where there is a repeated, sealed-bid auction with n bidders, but all we observe for each
round is who won, but not how much they bid or paid. We can also participate (i.e., submit a bid)
ourselves, and observe when we win. From this information, our goal is to (approximately) recover the
inherently recoverable part of the underlying bid distributions. We also consider extensions where dif-
ferent subsets of bidders participate in each round, and where bidders’ valuations have a common-value
component added to their independent private values.
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1 Introduction
Imagine that you get a call from your supervisor, who asks you to find out how much various companies
are bidding for banner advertisements on a competitor’s web site. She wants you to recover the distribution of
the bids for each one of the advertisers. Your boss might have many reasons why she wants this information:
to compare their bids there and on your web site; to use as market research for opening a new web site which
would be attractive to some of those advertisers; or simply to estimate the projected revenue.
This would be a trivial task if your competitor was willing to give you this information, but this is unlikely
to happen. Industrial espionage is illegal, and definitely not within your expertise as a computer scientist.
So, you approach this task from the basics and consider what you might observe. At best, you might be
able to observe the outcome for a particular auction, namely the winner, but definitely not the price, and
certainly not the bids of all participants. There is, however, a way to observe more detailed information:
you can participate in a sequence of auctions and see whether or not you win! If you lose with a bid b, you
know that the winner (and perhaps other bidders) bid more than b; if you win with bid b, you know every
other bidder bid less than b. In general, we assume you will also observe the winner of the auction explicitly
(e.g., you can visit the webpage and view the banner ad of the auction in question). Is this a strong enough
set of tools to recover the distributions over independent but not necessarily identical bid distributions?
If only your boss had instead given you the task of estimating the winning bid distribution in that auction,
you would be able to accomplish this easily. By inserting random bids, and observing their probability of
winning, you would be able to recover the distribution of the winning bid. However, this was not the task
you were assigned: your boss wants the distribution of each bidder’s bids, not just those where they win the
auction.
As a first attempt, your esteemed colleague suggests a trivial (and completely incorrect) approach (which
you do not even consider). As before, you can submit random bids, and observe for each advertiser, how
many times he wins in auctions with your random bid. This will estimate the distribution over bids he makes
in auctions he wins. However, when we condition on a bidder i winning, we should expect to see a sample
which is skewed towards higher bids. To see that the distribution over winning bids is a poor estimation for
the distribution over bids for each bidder, consider the following example. Suppose you can even observe the
bid of the winner. There are n advertisers, each bidding uniformly in [0, 1]. The distribution of the winning
bid of a given advertiser would have an expectation of nn+1 , whereas the expectation of his bid is
1
2 ; indeed,
the distribution over winning bids would be a poor approximation to his true bid distribution, namely,
uniform in [0, 1]. Additional complications arise with this approach when advertisers are asymmetric, which
is certainly the case in practice.
At this point, you decide to take a more formal approach, since the simplest possible technique fails mis-
erably. This leads you to the following abstraction. There are n bidders, where bidder i has bid distribution
Di. The n bidders participate in a sequence of auctions. In each auction, each bidder draws an independent
bid bi ∼ Di and submits it.
1 We have the power to submit a bid b0, which is independent of the bids bi, to
the auction. After each auction we observe the identity of the winner (but nothing else about the bids). Our
goal is to construct a distribution D̂i for each advertiser i which is close to Di in total variation. Our main
result in this work is to solve this problem efficiently. Namely, we derive a polynomial time algorithm (with
polynomial sample complexity) that recovers an approximation D̂i of each of the distributions Di, down to
some price pγ , below which there is at most γ probability of any bidder winning.
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Following your astonishing success in recovering the bid distributions of the advertisers, your boss has a
follow-up task for you. Not all items for sale, or users to which these ads are being shown, are created equal,
and the advertisers receive various attributes describing the user (item for sale) before they submit their bid.
1We remark that if the repeated auction is incentive-compatible the bid and valuation of the advertiser would be the same
(and we use them interchangeably). If this is not the case, then Di should be viewed as the distribution of bidder i’s bids.
2If the winning bid is never (or very rarely) below some price p, then we will not be able to learn approximations to the
distributions Di below p. For example, if bidder 1’s distribution D1 has support only on [ 12 , 1] and bidder 2’s distribution D2
has support only on [0, 1
2
), then since the winning bid is always at least 1
2
, we will never be able to learn anything about D2
other than the fact that its support lies in [0, 1
2
). Thus, our goal will be to learn a good approximation to each Di only above
a price pγ such that there is at least a γ probability of the winning bid being below pγ .
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Those attributes may include geographic location, language, operating system, browser, as well as highly
sensitive data that might be collected though cookies. Your boss asks you to recover how the advertisers bid
as a function of those vectors.
For this more challenging task, we can still help, under the assumption that we have access to these
attributes for the observed auctions, under some assumptions. We start with the assumption that each
bidder uses a linear function of the attributes for his bid. Namely, let x be the attribute vector of the user,
then each advertiser has a weight vector wi and his bid is x ·wi. For this case we are able to recover efficiently
an approximation ŵi of the weight vectors wi.
A related task is to assume that the value (or bid) of an advertiser has a common shared component plus
a private value which is stochastic. Namely, given a user with attributes x, the shared value is x · w, where
the w is the same to all advertisers, and each advertiser draws a private value vi ∼ Di. The bid of advertiser
i is x · w + vi The goal is to recover both the shared weights w as well as the individual distributions. We
do this by “reduction” to the case of no attributes, by first recovering an approximation ŵ for w, and then
using it to compute the common value for each user x.
One last extension we can handle focuses on who participates in the auction. So far, we assumed that in
each auction, all the advertisers participate. However, this assumption is not really needed. Our approach
is flexible enough, such that if we received for each auction the participants, this will be enough to recover
the bidding distributions for each bidder who shows up often enough. Note that if there are n advertisers
and each time a random subset shows up, we are unlikely to see the same subset show up twice; we can learn
about bidder i’s distribution over bids even when she is never competing in the same context, assuming her
bid distribution does not depend on who else is bidding.
1.1 Related Work
Problems of reconstructing distributional information from limited or censored observations have been
studied in both the medical statistics literature and the manufacturing/operations research literature. In
medical statistics, a basic setting where this problem arises is estimating survival rates (the likelihood of
death within t years of some medical procedure), when patients are continually dropping out of the study,
independently of their time of death. The seminal work in this area is the Kaplan-Meier product-limit
estimator [Kaplan and Meier, 1958], analyzed in the limit in the original paper and then for finite sample
sizes in Foldes and Rejto [1981], see also its use in Ganchev et al. [2010]. In the manufacturing literature,
this problem arises when a device, composed of multiple components, breaks down when the first of its
components breaks down. From the statistics of when devices break down and which components failed, the
goal is to reconstruct the distributions of individual component lifetimes [Nadas, 1970, Meilijson, 1981]. The
methods developed (and assumptions made, and types of results shown) in each literature are different. In
our work, we will build on the approach taken by the Kaplan-Meier estimator (described in more detail in
Section 3), as it is more flexible and better suited to the types of guarantees we wish to achieve, extending
it and using it as a subroutine for the kinds of weak observations we work with.
The area of prior-free mechanism design has aimed to understand what mechanisms achieve strong
guarantees with limited (or no) information about the priors of bidders, particularly in the area of revenue
maximization. There is a large variety truthful mechanisms that guarantee a constant approximation (see, cf,
Hartline and Karlin [2007]). A different direction is adversarial online setting which minimize the regret with
respect to the best single price (see, Kleinberg and Leighton [2003]), or minimizing the regret for the reserve
price of a second price auction Cesa-Bianchi et al. [2013]. In Cesa-Bianchi et al. [2013] it was assumed that
bidders have an identical bid distribution and the algorithm observes the actual sell price after each auction,
and based on this the bidding distribution is approximated.
A recent line of work tries to bridge between the Bayesian setting and the adversarial one, by assuming
we observe a limited number of samples. For a regular distribution, as single sample bidders’ distributions is
sufficient to get a 1/2-approximation to the optimal revenue [Dhangwatnotai et al., 2010], which follows from
an extension of the Bulow and Klemperer [1994] result that shows the revenue from a second-price auction
with n+1 (i.i.d) bidders is higher than the revenue from running a revenue-optimal auction with n bidders.
Recent work of Cole and Roughgarden [2014] analyzes the number of samples necessary to construct a 1− ǫ-
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approximately revenue optimal mechanism for asymmetric bidders: they show it is necessary and sufficient
to take poly
(
1
ǫ , n
)
samples from each bidder’s distribution to construct an 1− ǫ-revenue-optimal auction for
bid distributions are strongly regular. We stress that in this work we do not make any assumptions about
the bid distribution.
Chawla et al. [2014] design mechanisms which are approximately revenue-optimal and also allow for
good inference: from a sample of bids made in Bayes-Nash equilibrium, they would like to reconstruct the
distribution over values from which bidders are drawn. This learning technique relies heavily on a sample
being drawn unconditionally from the symmetric bid distribution, rather than only seeing the winner’s
identity from asymmetric bid distributions, as we consider in this work.
We stress that in all the “revenue maximization” literature has a fundamentally different objective than
the one in this paper. Namely, our goal is to reconstruct the bidders’ bid distributions, rather than focusing
of the revenue directly. Our work differs from previous work in this space in that it assumes very limited
observational information. Rather than assuming all n bids as an observation from a single run of the
auction, or even observing only the price, we see only the identity of highest bidder. We do not need to make
any regularity assumption on the bid distribution (monotone hazard rate, regular, etc.), our methodology
handles any continuous bid distribution.3
2 Model and Preliminaries
We assume there are n bidders, and each i ∈ [n] has some unknown valuation distribution Di over the
interval [0, 1]. Each sample t ∈ [m] refers to a fresh draw vti ∼ Di for each i. The label of sample t will
be denoted yt = argmaxiv
t
i , the identity of the highest bidder. Our goal is to estimate Fi, the cumulative
distribution for Di, for each bidder i, up to ǫ additive error for all values in a given range. In Section 4 we
examine extensions and modifications to this basic model.
We consider the problem of finding (sample and computationally) efficient algorithms for constructing
an estimate F̂i of Fi, the cumulative distribution function, such that for all bidders i and price levels p,
F̂i(p) ∈ {Fi(p)± ǫ}. However, as discussed above, this goal is too ambitious in two ways. First, if the labels
contain no information about the value of bids, the best we could hope to learn is the relative probability
each person might win, which is insufficient to uniquely identify the CDFs, even without sampling error. We
address this issue by allowing, at each time t, our learning algorithm to insert a fake bidder 0 (or reserve)
of value vt0 = r
t; the label at time t will be yt = argmaxiv
t
i (y
t = 0 will refer to a sample where the
reserve was not met, or the fake bidder won the auction). The other issue, also described above, is that
there will be values below which we simply cannot estimate the Di since bids below that value do not win.
In particular, if bids below price p never win, then any two cumulatives Fi, F
′
i that agree above p will be
statistically indistinguishable. Thus, we will consider a slightly weaker goal. We will guarantee our estimates
F̂i(p) ∈ Fi(p)±ǫ for all p where P[someone winning with a bid at most p] ≥ γ. Then, our goal is to minimize
m, the number of samples necessary, to do so, and we hope to have m ∈ poly(n, 1ǫ ,
1
γ ), with high probability
of success over the draw of the sample. One final (and necessary) assumption we will make is that each Di
has no point masses, and our algorithm will be polynomial in the maximum slope L of the Fis.
4.
2.1 A brief primer on the Kaplan-Meier estimator
Our work is closely related in spirit to that of the Kaplan-Meier estimator, KM, for survival time; in this
section, we describe the techniques used for constructing the KM [Kaplan and Meier, 1958]. This will give
some intuition for the estimator we present in Section 3. We translate the results found in Kaplan and Meier
[1958] to an auction setting from the survival rate literature. Suppose each sample t is of the following form.
3Note that we measure the distance between two distributions using the total variation distance, which is essentially “addi-
tive”.
4This assumption is useful for this paper for two reasons. First, it allows us to eschew any issues associated with tie-breaking,
since they happen with probability 0. Second, if there were no continuity assumption, there might be point masses. If we wished
to have an additive accuracy guarantee as above, this would force our learning algorithm to be able to determine the exact
location of these point masses, which couldn’t be done in polynomial time (for example, suppose Fi had a point mass at
√
2).
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Each bidder i draws their bid bti ∼ Di independently of each other bid. The label y
t = (maxi b
t
i, argmaxib
t
i)
consists of the winning bid and the identity of the winner. From this, we would like to reconstruct an
estimate F̂i of Fi. Given m samples, relabel them so that the winning bids are in increasing order, e.g.
b1i1 ≤ b
2
i2
≤ bmim . Here is some intuition behind the KM: P[bi ≤ x] = P[bi ≤ x|bi ≤ y] · P[bi ≤ y] for y > x.
Repeatedly applying this, we can see that, for x < y1 < y2 < · · · < yr,
Fi(x) = P[bi ≤ x] = P[bi ≤ x|bi ≤ y1] P[bi ≤ y1|bi ≤ y2] · · ·P[bi ≤ yr−1|bi ≤ yr] P[bi ≤ yr]
= P[bi ≤ x|bi ≤ y1] P[bi ≤ yr]
r∏
t=1
P[bi ≤ yt|bi ≤ yt+1]
(1)
Now, we can employ the observation in Equation 1, if only we knew how to convert the samples into estimates
of such conditional probabilities. Since other players’ bids are independent, we can estimate the conditional
probabilities as follows:
P
[
bi ≤ b
t
it |bi ≤ b
t+1
it+1
]
≈
{
t−1
t if i won sample t
1 if j 6= i won sample t
(2)
Thus, combining Equations 1 and 2, we have the Kaplan-Meier estimator:
KM(x) =
∏
t:bt
j
≥x
(
t− 1
t
)I[i won sample t]
Our estimator is morally similar to KM, though it differs in several important ways. First, and most im-
portantly, we do not see the winning bid explicitly; instead, we will just have lower or upper bounds on
the highest non-reserve bid (namely, the reserve bid when someone wins or we win, respectively). Secondly,
KM generally has no control issue; in our setting, we are choosing one of the values which will censor our
observation. We need to pick appropriate reserves to get a good estimator (picking reserves that are too
high will censor too many observations, only giving us uninformative upper bounds on bids, and reserves
that are too low will never win, giving us uninformative lower bounds on bids). Our estimator searches the
space [0, 1] for appropriate price points to use as reserves to balance these concerns.
3 Learning bidders’ valuation distributions
In this section, we assume we have the power to insert a reserve price, and observe who won. Using this,
we would like to reconstruct the CDFs of each bidder i up to some error, down to some price pi where i has
probability no more than γ of winning at or below pi, up to additive accuracy ǫ. Our basic plan of attack
is as follows. We start by estimating the probability i wins with a bid in some range [a, a + δ], by setting
reserve prices at a and a+ δ, and measuring the difference in empirical probability that i wins with the two
reserves. We then estimate the probability that no bidder bids above a + δ (by setting a reserve of a + δ
and observing the empirical probability that no one wins). These together will be enough to estimate the
probability that i wins with a bid in that range, conditioned on no one bidding above the range. We then
show, for a small enough range, this is a good estimate for the probability i bids in the range, conditioned
on no one bidding above the range. Then, we chain these estimates together to form Kaplan, our estimator.
More specifically, to make this work we select a partition of [0, 1] into a collection of intervals. This
partition should have the following property. Within each interval [x, y], there should be probability at most
β of any person bidding in [x, y], conditioned on no one bidding above y. This won’t be possible for the
lowest interval, but will be true for the other intervals. Then, the algorithm estimates the probability i will
win in [x, y] conditioned on all bidders bidding at most y. This then (1− β) (multiplicatively) approximates
the probability i bids in [x, y] (conditioned on all bidders bidding less than y). Then, the algorithm combines
these estimates in a way such that the approximation factors do not blow up to reconstruct the CDF.
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Algorithm 1: Kaplan, estimates the CDF of i from samples with reserves
Data: ǫ, γ, δ, L, where L is the Lipschitz constant of the Fis
Result: F̂i
1 Let F̂i(0) = 0, F̂i(1) = 1, k =
2Ln
βγ + 1, δ
′ = δ3k(log k+1) , β =
ǫγ
32nL , α = β
2/96, µ = β/96, T = 8 ln 6/δ
′
α2γ2(µ2 )
2 ;
2 Let ℓ1, . . . , ℓk′ = Intervals(β, γ, T );
3 for t = 2 to k′ − 1 do
4 Let rℓτ ,ℓτ+1 = IWin(i, ℓτ , ℓτ+1, T );
5 for t = 2 to k′ − 1 do
6 Let F̂i(ℓτ ) =
∏
τ ′≥t+1(1− rℓτ′ ,ℓτ′+1);
7 Define F̂i(x) = maxℓτ≤x F̂i(ℓτ );
Theorem 3.1. With probability at least 1− δ, Kaplan outputs F̂i, an estimate of Fi, with sample complexity
m = O
n8L8 ln nLǫγ
(
ln 1δ + ln ln
nL
ǫγ
)
γ10ǫ6

and, for all p where P[∃ js.t. j wins with a bid ≤ p] ≥ γ, if each CDF is L-Lipschitz, the error is at most:
Fi(p)− ǫ ≤ F̂i(p) ≤ Fi(p) + ǫ.
Kaplan calls several other functions, which we will now informally describe, and state several Lemmas
describing their guarantees (the formal definitions can be found in Figure 1 and the proofs can be found in
Appendix A). IWin estimates the probability i wins in the region [ℓτ , ℓτ+1], conditioned on all bids being at
most ℓτ+1. Intervals partitions [0, 1] into small enough intervals such that, conditioned on all bids being
in or below that interval, the probability of any bidder bidding within the interval is small. (Essentially, ℓ2
is pγ , and therefore we are not interested in the estimation in [0, ℓ2], and by definition ℓ1 = 0.)
Here are three lemmas which will be useful in the proof of Theorem 3.1. Lemma 3.2 bounds the number of
samples IWin uses and bounds the error of its estimate. Lemma 3.3 does similarly for Intervals. Lemma 3.4
states that, if a region [ℓτ , ℓτ+1] is small enough, the probability that i bids in [ℓτ , ℓτ+1] (conditioned on
all bids being at most ℓτ+1) is well-approximated by the probability that i wins with a bid in [ℓτ , ℓτ+1]
(conditioned on all bids being at most ℓτ+1). In combination, these three imply a guarantee on the sample
complexity and accuracy of estimating P[i wins in [ℓτ , ℓτ+1]|maxj bj ≤ ℓτ+1], which is the key ingredient of
the Kaplan estimator.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose, for a fixed interval [ℓτ , ℓτ+1], P[i wins in [0, ℓτ+1]] ≥ γ. Then, IWin (i, ℓτ , ℓτ+1, T )
outputs piℓτ ,ℓτ+1 such that
(1−µ)P[i wins in [ℓτ , ℓτ+1]|max
j
bj ≤ ℓτ+1]−α ≤ p
i
ℓτ ,ℓτ+1 ≤ (1+µ)P[i wins in [ℓτ , ℓτ+1]|maxj
bj ≤ ℓτ+1]+α,
with probability at least 1− 3δ′ and uses 3T samples, for the values of T, δ′ as in Kaplan.
Lemma 3.3. Let T as in Kaplan. Then, Intervals(β, γ, T, L, n) returns 0 = ℓ1 < · · · < ℓk = 1 such that
1. k ≤ 48Lnβγ
2. For each τ ∈ [2, k], P[maxj bj ∈ [ℓτ , ℓτ+1]|maxj bj ≤ ℓτ+1] ≤
β
16
3. P[maxj bj ∈ [ℓ1, ℓ2]] ≤ γ
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with probability at least 1−3k log(k)δ′, when bidders’ CDFs are L-Lipschitz, using at most 3kT log k samples.
With the guarantee of Lemma 3.3, we know that the partition of [0, 1] returned by Intervals is “fine
enough”. Now, Lemma 3.4 shows that, when the partition fine enough, the conditional probability i wins
with a bid in each interval is a good estimate for the conditional probability i bids within that interval.
Lemma 3.4. Suppose that, for bidder i and some 0 ≤ ℓτ ≤ ℓτ+1 ≤ 1,
P[max
j 6=i
bj ∈ [ℓτ , ℓτ+1]|max
j 6=i
bj < ℓτ+1] ≤ β.
Then,
1 ≥
P[i wins in [ℓτ , ℓτ+1]|maxj bj < ℓτ+1]
P[i bids in [ℓτ , ℓτ+1]|maxj bj < ℓτ+1]
≥ 1− β
Finally, we observe that Fi can be written as the product of conditional probabilities
Observation 3.5. Consider some set of points 0 < ℓ1 < . . . < ℓk = 1. Fi(ℓτ ) can be rewritten as the
following product:
Fi(ℓτ−1) = Fi(ℓτ )(1−P[bi ≥ ℓτ−1|bi ≤ ℓτ ]) =
∏
τ ′≥t
(1−P[bi ≥ ℓτ ′−1|bi ≤ ℓτ ′]) =
∏
τ ′≥t
(1−P[bi ∈ [ℓτ ′−1, ℓτ ′]|bi ≤ ℓτ ′ ])
With these pieces in place, we prove Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Notice that there are at most k′ events each of which happens with probability at
most δ′ = δk′ (namely, that Intervals returns a poor partition, or for each interval, of which there are
at most k′ − 1, by Lemma 3.3, that IWin is not accurate as described by Lemma 3.2). Thus, by a union
bound, none of these events occur with probability 1 − δ. Thus, for the remainder of the proof we assume
the partition returned by Intervals is good and each call to IWin is accurate.
It will suffice to prove, for the lattice points in our discretization, that Kaplan provides an ǫ-approximation
to the CDF. This follows because
Fi(ℓτ )− Fi(ℓτ−1) = P[i bids in [ℓτ−1, ℓτ ]]
= P[i bids in [ℓτ−1, ℓτ ]|bi ≤ ℓτ ]
≤ P[i bids in [ℓτ−1, ℓτ ]|max
j
bj ≤ ℓτ ]
≤ (1 + β)P[i wins in [ℓτ−1, ℓτ ]|max
j
bj ≤ ℓτ ]
≤ (1 + β)β = β + β2 ≤
ǫ
2
where the third and fourth inequality follows from Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.4, and the final one from the
fact that β < ǫ4 . Thus, our lattice is fine enough that it suffices to show accuracy of the lattice points. We
start by rewriting Fi(ℓτ ), using Observation 3.5:
Fi(ℓτ ) =
∏
τ ′≥τ+1
(1− P[bi ∈ [ℓτ ′−1, ℓτ ′] | bi ≤ ℓτ ′ ]). (3)
So, one can compute the probability of bidding at most ℓτ−1 by multiplying together a collection of prob-
abilities of bidding within intervals above ℓτ . Let the event maxj bj ≤ ℓτ ′ be denoted Mℓτ′ . Now, we can
apply Lemma 3.3 to imply that, for all τ ′,
P[max
j
bj ∈ [ℓτ ′−1, ℓτ ′]|Mℓτ′ ] ≤
β
16
= β′
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which, by Lemma 3.4, implies for all τ ′ that
1 ≥
P[i wins in [ℓτ ′−1, ℓτ ′]|Mℓτ′ ]
P[i bids in [ℓτ ′−1, ℓτ ′]|mℓτ′ ]
=
P[i wins in [ℓτ ′−1, ℓτ ′ ]|Mℓτ′ ]
P[i bids in [ℓτ ′−1, ℓτ ′]|i bids in [0, ℓτ ′]]
≥ 1− β′ (4)
where the equality comes from the independence of the bids. Then, combining Equations (4) and (3), we
know ∏
τ ′≥τ+1
(
1− P[i wins in [ℓτ ′−1, ℓτ ′ ]|Mℓτ′ ]
)
= Fi(ℓτ ) ≥
∏
τ ′≥τ+1
(1−
P[i wins in [ℓτ ′−1, ℓτ ′]|Mℓτ′ ]
1− β′
)
Then, by Fact A.3,
Fi(ℓτ ) ∈
 ∏
τ ′≥τ+1
(
1− (1 + 2β′)P[i wins in [ℓτ ′−1, ℓτ ′ ]|Mℓτ′ ]
)
,
∏
τ ′≥τ+1
(
1− P[i wins in [ℓτ ′−1, ℓτ ′]|Mℓτ′ ]
)
Now, Lemma 3.2 states that the result of IWin are correct within an additive α and multiplicative µ, thus∏
τ ′≥τ+1
(1− (1 + µ)P[i wins in [ℓτ ′−1, ℓτ ′]|Mℓτ′ ]− α) ≤ F̂i(ℓτ ) ≤
∏
τ ′≥τ+1
(1− (1− µ)P[i wins in [ℓτ ′−1, ℓτ ′]|Mℓτ′ ] + α).
Now, we simply need to look at the potential difference in these terms. We will consider the lower bound on
Fi(ℓτ ) and upper bound on F̂i(ℓτ ) (the other direction is analogous).∏
τ ′≥τ+1
(1− (1− µ)P
[
i wins in [ℓτ ′−1, ℓτ ′ ]|Mℓτ′
]
+ α)−
∏
τ ′≥t+1
(1− (1 + 2β′)P
[
i wins in [ℓτ ′−1, ℓτ ′ ]|Mℓτ′
]
)
≤
∏
τ ′≥τ+1
(1− P
[
i wins in [ℓτ ′−1, ℓτ ′ ]|Mℓτ′
]
+ µβ′ + α) −
∏
τ ′≥τ+1
(1− P
[
i wins in [ℓτ ′−1, ℓτ ′ ]|Mℓτ′
]
− 2β′2)
≤
∏
τ ′≥τ+1
(1− P
[
i wins in [ℓτ ′−1, ℓτ ′ ]|Mℓτ′
]
+ β′2)−
∏
τ ′≥τ+1
(1− P
[
i wins in [ℓτ ′−1, ℓτ ′]|Mℓτ′
]
− 2β′2)
≤
∏
τ ′≥τ+1
(1− 2β′2)(1 − P
[
i wins in [ℓτ ′−1, ℓτ ′ ]|Mℓτ′
]
)−
∏
τ ′≥τ+1
(1 + 2β′2)(1− P
[
i wins in [ℓτ ′−1, ℓτ ′]||Mℓτ′
]
)
≤ (1− 2β′2)k
∏
τ ′≥τ+1
(1− P
[
i wins in [ℓτ ′−1, ℓτ ′]|Mℓτ′
]
)− (1 + 4β′2)k
∏
τ ′≥τ+1
(1− P
[
i wins in [ℓτ ′−1, ℓτ ′ ]|Mℓτ′
]
)
≤ (1− 4kβ′2)
∏
τ ′≥τ+1
(1− P
[
i wins in [ℓτ ′−1, ℓτ ′]|Mℓτ′
]
)− (1 + 8kβ′2)
∏
τ ′≥t+1
(1 − P
[
i wins in [ℓτ ′−1, ℓτ ′]|Mℓτ′
]
)
≤ 12kβ′2 ≤ 12
16Ln
βγ
β′2 ≤
3Lnβ
γ
≤
ǫ
2
where the first follows from P [i wins in [ℓτ ′−1, ℓτ ′]|maxj bj < ℓτ ′] ≤ β
′, the second by the definition of
α = β
′2
2 , µ =
β′
2 , the third again, by P
[
i wins in [ℓτ ′−1, ℓτ ′]|Mℓτ′
]
≤ β′, the fourth from 2β′ < 12 , the fifth
and sixth from basic algebra, the seventh by the bound on k ≤ 16Lnβγ , by Lemma 3.3, the eighth by β
′ = β16 ,
and the ninth by β = ǫγ32nL .
The sample complexity bound and failure probability follow from Lemmas 3.3 and 3.2, substituting in
for various parameters, since IWin is called k times. Thus, in total, there are ≤ 3k log(k) + 3k empirical
estimates made, each with probability at most δ′ of failure, each with sample size T .
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Algorithm 2: Inside, estimates P[maxj bj ≥ ℓτ |maxj bj ≤ ℓτ+1]
Data: ℓτ , ℓτ+1, T
Result: p∈ℓτ ,ℓτ+1
1 Let S1 be a sample of size T with reserve ℓτ ;
2 Let S2 be a sample of size T with reserve ℓτ+1;
3 Return p∈ℓτ ,ℓτ+1 = 1−
∑
t∈S2
I[0 wins t]∑
t∈S1
I[0 wins t] ;
Algorithm 3: IWin, Estimates P[i wins in [ℓτ , ℓτ+1]|maxj bj < ℓτ+1]
Data: i, ℓτ , ℓτ+1, T
Result: piℓτ ,ℓτ+1
1 Let Sℓτ be a sample with reserve ℓτ+1 of size T ;
2 Let Sℓτ+1 be a sample with reserve ℓτ of size T ;
3 Let Scond be a sample with reserve ℓτ+1 of size T ;
4 Output piℓτ ,ℓτ+1 =
∑
t∈Sℓτ
I[i wins on sample t]−
∑
t∈Sℓτ+1
I[i wins on sample t]
∑
t∈Scond
I[0 wins on sample t] ;
Algorithm 4: Intervals, finds a partition of the bid space into regions where we estimate fi
Data: β, γ, T, n, L
Result: 0 = ℓ1 < . . . < ℓk = 1
1 Let ℓk = 1, c = k, p
i
ℓc
= 1;
2 while piℓc > γ/2 do // Do binary search for the bottom of the next interval
3 Let ℓ̂b = 0;
4 while Inside(ℓ̂b, ℓc, T ) >
β
48 do // The interval is too large
5 ℓ̂b =
ℓc+ℓ̂b
2 ;
6 ℓc−1 = ℓ̂b;
7 c = c− 1;
8 Let S1 be a sample of size T with reserve ℓc−1;
9 pℓc =
∑
t∈S1
I[j≥1 wins on sample t]
T ;
10 Return 0, ℓc, . . . , ℓk;
Figure 1: Helper functions
3.1 Subsets
The argument above extends directly to a more general scenario in which not all bidders necessarily show
up each time, and instead there is some distribution over 2[k] over which bidders show up each time the
auction is run. As mentioned above, this is quite natural in settings where bidders are companies that may
or may not need the auctioned resource at any given time, or keyword auctions where there is a distribution
over keywords, and companies only participate in the auction of keywords that are relevant to them. To
handle this case, we simply apply Algorithm 1 to just the subset of time steps in which bidder i showed up
when learning F̂i. We use the fact here that even though the distribution over subsets of bidders that show
up need not be a product distribution (e.g., certain bidders may tend to show up together), the maximum
bid value of the other bidders who show up with bidder i is a random variable that is independent of bidder
i’s bid. Thus all the above arguments extend directly. The sample complexity bound of Theorem 3.1 is
now a sample complexity on observations of bidder i (and so requires roughly a 1/q blowup in total sample
complexity to learn the distribution for a bidder that shows up only a q fraction of the time).
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4 Extensions and Other Models
So far we have been in the usual model of independent private values. That is, on each run of the auction,
bidder i’s value is vi ∼ Di, drawn independently from the other vj . We now consider models motivated by
settings where we have different items being auctioned on each round, such as different cameras, cars, or
laptops, and these items have observable properties, or features, that affect their value to each bidder.
In the first (easier) model we consider, each bidder i has its own private weight vector wi ∈ R
d (which
we don’t see), and each item is a feature vector x ∈ Rd (which we do see). The value for bidder i on item x
is wi · x, and the winner is the highest bidder argmaxiwi · x. There is a distribution P over items, but no
additional private randomness. Our goal, from submitting bids and observing the identity of the winner, is
to learn estimates w˜i that approximate the true wi in the sense that for random x ∼ P , with probability
≥ 1− ǫ, the w˜i correctly predict the winner and how much the winner values the item x up to ±ǫ.
In the second model we consider, there is just a single common vector w, but we reintroduce the distri-
butions Di. In particular, the value of bidder i on item x is w · x + vi where vi ∼ Di. The “w · x” portion
can be viewed as a common value due to the intrinsic worth of the object, and if w = ~0 then this reduces
to the setting studied in previous sections. The goal of the algorithm is to learn both the common vector w
and all the Di.
The common generalization of the above two models, with different unknown vectors wi and unknown
distributions Di appears to be quite a bit more difficult (in part because the expected value of a draw from
Di conditioned on bidder i winning depends on the vector x). We leave as an open problem to resolve
learnability (positively or negatively) in such a model. We assume that ‖x‖2 ≤ 1 and ‖wi‖2 ≤ 1, and as
before, all valuations are in [0, 1].
4.1 Private value vectors without private randomness
Here we present an algorithm for the setting where each bidder i has its own private vector wi ∈ R
d, and
its value for an item x ∈ Rd is wi · x. There is a distribution P over items, and our goal, from submitting
bids and observing the identity of the winner, is to accurately predict the winner and the winning bid.
Specifically, we prove the following:
Theorem 4.1. With probability ≥ 1− δ, the algorithm below using sample size
m = O
(
1
ǫ2
[
dn2 log(1/ǫ) + log(1/δ)
])
produces w˜i such that on a 1− ǫ probability mass of x ∼ P we have i
∗ ≡ argmaxiw˜i · x = argmaxiwi · x (i.e.,
a correct prediction of the winner), and additionally have |w˜i∗ · x− wi∗ · x| ≤ ǫ.
Proof. Our algorithm is simple. We will participate in m auctions using bids chosen uniformly at random
from {0, ǫ, 2ǫ, . . . , 1}. We observe the winners, then solve for a consistent set of w˜i using linear programming.
Specifically, for t = 1, . . . ,m, if bidder it wins item xt for which we bid bt, then we have linear inequalities:
w˜it · xt > w˜j · xt (∀j 6= it)
w˜it · xt > bt.
Similarly, if we win the item, we have:
bt > w˜j · xt (∀j).
Let P∗ denote the distribution over pairs (x, b) induced by drawing x from P and b uniformly at random
from {0, ǫ, 2ǫ, . . . , 1} and consider a (k + 1)-valued target function f∗ that given a pair (x, b) outputs an
integer in {0, 1, . . . , n} indicating the winner (with 0 indicating that our bid b wins). By design, the vectors
w˜1, . . . , w˜n solved for above yield the correct answer (the correct highest bidder) on all m pairs (x, b) in
our training sample. We argue below that m is sufficiently large so that by a standard sample complexity
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analysis, with probability at least 1− δ, the true error rate of the vectors w˜i under P
∗ is at most ǫ2/(1 + ǫ).
This in particular implies that for at least a (1 − ǫ) probability mass of items x under P , the vectors w˜i
predict the correct winner for all 1+ǫǫ bids b ∈ {0, ǫ, 2ǫ, . . . , 1} (by Markov’s inequality). This implies that
for this (1− ǫ) probability mass of items x, not only do the w˜i correctly predict the winning bidder but they
also correctly predict the winning bid value up to ±ǫ as desired.
Finally, we argue the bound onm. Any given set of n vectors w˜1, . . . , w˜n induces a (n+1)-way partition of
the (d+1)-dimensional space of pairs (x, b) based on which of {0, . . . , n} will be the winner (with 0 indicating
that b wins). Each element of the partition is a convex region defined by halfspaces, and in particular there
are only O(n2) hyperplane boundaries, one for each pair of regions. Therefore, the total number of ways of
partitioning m data-points is at most O(m(d+1)n
2
). The result then follows by standard VC upper bounds
for desired error rate ǫ2/(1 + ǫ).
4.2 Common value vectors with private randomness
We now consider the case that there is just a single common vector w, but we reintroduce the distributions
Di. In particular, there is some distribution P over x ∈ R
d, and the value of bidder i on item x is w · x+ vi
where vi ∼ Di. As before, we assume that ‖x‖2 ≤ 1 and ‖wi‖2 ≤ 1, and all valuations are in [0, 1]. The goal
of the algorithm is to learn both the common vector w and all the Di. We show here how we can solve this
problem by first learning a good approximation w˜ to w which then allows us to reduce to the problem of
Section 3. In particular, given parameter ǫ′, we will learn w˜ such that
Pr
x∼P
(|w · x− w˜ · x| ≤ ǫ′) ≥ 1− ǫ′.
Once we learn such a w˜, we can reduce to the case of Section 3 as follows: every time the algorithm of
Section 3 queries with some reserve bid b, we submit instead the bid b + w˜ · x. The outcome of this query
now matches the setting of independent private values, but where (due to the slight error in w˜) after the
vi are each drawn from Di, there is some small random fluctuation that is added (and an ǫ
′ fraction of the
time, there is a large fluctuation). But since we can make ǫ′ as polynomially small as we want, this becomes
a vanishing term in the independent private values analysis. Thus, it suffices to learn a good approximation
w˜ to w, which we do as follows.
Theorem 4.2. With probability ≥ 1− δ, the algorithm below using running time and sample size polynomial
in d, n, 1/ǫ′, and log(1/δ), produces w˜ such that Prx∼P [|w˜ · x− w · x| ≤ ǫ
′] ≥ 1− ǫ′.
Proof. Let Dmax denote the distribution over max[v1, ..., vn]. By performing an additive offset, specifically,
by adding a new feature x0 that is always equal to 1 and setting the corresponding weight w0 to be the mean
value of Dmax, we may assume without loss of generality from now on that Dmax has mean value 0.
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Now, consider the following distribution over labeled examples (x, y). We draw x at random from P . To
produce the label y, we bid a uniform random value in [0, 1] and set y = 1 if we lose and y = 0 if we win (we
ignore the identity of the winner when we lose). The key point here is that if the highest bidder for some
item x bid a value b ∈ [0, 1], then with probability b we lose and set y = 1 and with probability 1− b we win
and set y = 0. So, E[y] = b. Moreover, since b = w · x + vmax, where vmax is picked from Dmax which has
mean value of 0, we have E[b|x] = w · x. So, E[y|x] = w · x.
So, we have examples x with labels in {0, 1} such that E[y|x] = w · x. This implies that w · x is the
predictor of minimum squared loss over this distribution on labeled examples (in fact, it minimizes mean
squared error for every point x). Moreover, any real-valued predictor h(x) = w˜ ·x that satisfies the condition
that E(x,y)[(w˜ · x− y)
2] ≤ E(x,y)[(w · x− y)
2] + ǫ′3 must satisfy the condition:
Pr
x∼P
(|w · x− w˜ · x| ≤ ǫ′) ≥ 1− ǫ′.
This is because a predictor that fails this condition incurs an additional squared loss of ǫ′2 on at least an ǫ′
probability mass of the points. Finally, since all losses are bounded (we know all values w · x are bounded
5Adding such an x0 and w0 has the effect of modifying each vi to vi − E[vmax]. The resulting distributions over w · x+ vi
are all the same as before, but now Dmax has a zero mean value.
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since we have assumed all valuations are in [0, 1], so we can restrict to w˜ such that w˜ · x are all bounded),
standard confidence bounds imply that minimizing mean squared error over a sufficiently (polynomially)
large sample will achieve the desired near-optimal squared loss over the underlying distribution.
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A Inequalities
Lemma A.1. Suppose X is observable and Y is observable, and assume that P[Y ] ≥ γ. Using 2T samples,
with probability 1− δ, we can estimate P[X |Y ] = P[X∩Y ]
P[Y ] buy pˆ such that
P[X |Y ]− α− µ ≤ (1− µ)P[X |Y ]− α ≤ pˆ ≤ (1 + µ)P[X |Y ] + α ≤ P[X |Y ] + α+ µ,
As a direct corollary, we know that Inside is a close approximation to the quantity it estimates.
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Corollary A.2. Inside(ℓτ , ℓτ+1, T ) outputs an estimator p
∈
ℓτ ,ℓτ+1
, such that, for T as in Kaplan,
(1− µ)P[max
j
bj ≥ ℓτ |max
j
bj ≤ ℓτ+1]− α ≤ p
∈
ℓτ ,ℓτ+1
≤ (1 + µ)P[max
j
bj ≥ ℓτ |max
j
bj ≤ ℓτ+1] + α
and uses 2T samples.
Now, we prove Lemma 3.4, which is also a corollary of Lemma A.1.
Proof of Lemma 3.4. Let, for a fixed i, ℓτ , ℓτ+1, the event that i bids in [ℓτ , ℓτ+1] be denoted by X , the event
that i wins in [ℓτ , ℓτ+1] be denoted by Y , and the event that maxj bj < ℓτ+1 be denoted by C.
With this notation, we have an estimate of P[Y |C] and want an estimate of P[X |C].
P[Y |C] = P[X |C]× P[Y |C,X ]
≥ P[X |C]× P[everyone but i bids < ℓτ |C,X ]
= P[X |C]× P[everyone but i bids < ℓτ |C]
≥ P[X |C]× (1− β)
The first equality comes from the fact that Y ⊆ X , the next inequality comes from the fact that,
conditioned on C and X , everyone but i bids < ℓτ is a subset of Y (the times when i will win), the next
equality comes from the fact that i’s bid and j’s bid are independent, and the final inequality follows from
the assumption P[maxj 6=i bj < ℓτ |maxj 6=i bj < ℓτ+1] ≥ 1− β.
Fact A.3. Suppose x ≥ 0 and 0 < η < 12 . Then
x
1+η ≥ (1 − η)x and
x
1−η ≤ (1 + 2η)x.
Proof of Fact A.3. We prove x1+η ≥ (1− η)x first.
x
1 + η
=
(1− η)x
1− η2
≥ (1− η)x (Since 1− η2 < 1)
Now, we prove x1−η ≤ (1 + 2η)x, for η ≤ 1/2. We have,
x
1− η
= x
∞∑
i=0
ηi = x
(
1 + η(
∞∑
i=0
ηi)
)
≤ (1 + 2η)x,
where the inequality follows from the fact that for η ≤ 1/2 we have
∑∞
i=0 η
i = 11−η ≤ 2.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. We start by showing that, with no sampling error, the calculation pix,y we do is equiv-
alent to qix,y = P[bi ∈ [x, y] ∧ bi > maxj 6=i bj |maxj bj < y]. When x = y, we will denote this simply as q
i
x
(similarly, pix). Similarly, let q
0
x denote the probability that no one wins when the reserve bidder is set to
bid x (and p0x the empirical probability therein).
By definition,
12
qiℓτ ,ℓτ+1 = P[bi ∈ [ℓτ , ℓτ+1] ∧ bi > maxj 6=i
bj |max
j
bj < ℓτ+1]
=
P[bi ∈ [ℓτ , ℓτ+1] ∧ bi > maxj 6=i bj ∧maxj bj < ℓτ+1]
P[maxj bj < ℓτ+1]
=
P[bi ∈ [ℓτ , ℓτ+1] ∧ bi > maxj 6=i bj ]
P[maxj bj < ℓτ+1]
(i winning in [ℓτ , ℓτ+1] implies max
j
bj < ℓτ+1)
=
P[bi ≥ ℓτ ∧ bi > maxj 6=i bj ]− P[bi ≥ ℓτ+1 ∧ bi > maxj 6=i bj ]
P[maxj bj < ℓτ+1]
=
P[i wins with reserve ℓτ ]− P[i wins with reserve ℓτ+1]
P[maxj bj < ℓτ+1]
(Assuming no point masses, there are no ties)
=
qiℓτ ,1 − q
i
ℓτ+1,1
q0ℓτ+1
The final form is identical to the estimated quantity used by IWin. It now suffices to now show that each
of the three samples give us good estimates of their respective true probabilities. A basic Chernoff bound
implies
P[|pix,1 − q
i
x,1| ≥
αγ(1 − µ)
4
] ≤ 2e−T
1
8
t1α
2γ2(1−µ)2 .
Substituting T = 8 ln 6/δ
′
α2γ2(µ2 )
2 , and noting µ < 1− µ, we have
P[|pix,1 − q
i
x,1| ≥
αγ(1− µ)
4
] ≤ δ′
for each of x = ℓτ , ℓτ+1. Similarly,
P[|p0x − q
0
x| >
µγ
2
] ≤ 2e−
T
2
µ2γ2
and substituting for T , we have that |p0ℓτ+1 − q
0
ℓτ+1
| ≥ µγ2 with probability at most δ
′. Thus, using a union
bound, we have that with probability at least 1− 3δ′, for a particular t,
qiℓτ ,1 − q
i
ℓτ+1,1
− αγ(1−µ)2
q0ℓτ+1 +
µγ
2
≤
piℓτ ,1 − p
i
ℓτ+1,1
p0ℓτ+1
≤
qiℓτ ,1 − q
i
ℓτ+1,1
+ αγ(1−µ)2
q0ℓτ+1 −
µγ
2
(5)
Now, it suffices to show that Equation (5) implies the relative error stated previously. By assumption,
pi0,ℓτ+1 > γ. This implies that the probability everyone bids at most ℓτ+1 is at least γ (for a winning bid of
ℓτ+1 to win, all bids must be at most ℓτ+1), so
q0ℓτ+1 ≥ γ. (6)
Then,
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piℓτ ,ℓτ+1 =
piℓτ ,1 − p
i
ℓτ+1,1
p0ℓτ+1
≥
qiℓτ ,1 − q
i
ℓτ+1,1
− 12αγ(1 − µ)
q0ℓτ+1 +
µγ
2
≥
qiℓτ ,1 − q
i
ℓτ+1,1
− αγ
q0ℓτ+1 + µγ
(Since
(1− µ)
2
< 1)
≥
qiℓτ ,1 − q
i
ℓτ+1,1
− αγ
q0ℓτ+1 + µq
0
ℓτ+1
(By Eq. (6))
=
qiℓτ ,1 − q
i
ℓτ+1,1
− αγ
q0ℓτ+1(1 + µ)
=
qiℓτ ,ℓτ+1
1 + µ
−
αγ
q0ℓτ+1(1 + µ)
≥
qiℓτ ,ℓτ+1
1 + µ
−
α
(1 + µ)
(By Eq. (6))
≥
qiℓτ ,ℓτ+1
1 + µ
− α
≥ (1 − µ)qiℓτ ,ℓτ+1 − α (By Fact A.3)
Now, we prove the upper bound on our estimator.
piℓτ ,ℓτ+1 =
piℓτ ,1 − p
i
ℓτ+1,1
p0ℓτ+1
≤
qiℓτ ,1 − q
i
ℓτ+1,1
+ (1−µ)2 αγ
q0ℓτ+1 −
µγ
2
≤
qiℓτ ,1 − q
i
ℓτ+1,1
+ (1− µ)αγ
q0ℓτ+1 −
µγ
2
≤
qiℓτ ,1 − q
i
ℓτ+1,1
+ (1− µ)αγ
q0ℓτ+1 −
µq0
ℓτ+1,ℓτ+1
2
(By Eq. (6))
≤
qiℓτ ,ℓτ+1
1− µ2
+
(1− µ)αγ
q0ℓτ+1(1−
µ
2 )
≤
qiℓτ ,ℓτ+1
1− µ2
+
αγ
q0ℓτ+1
≤
qiℓτ ,ℓτ+1
1− µ2
+ α (By Eq. (6))
≤ (1 + 2
µ
2
)qiℓτ ,ℓτ+1 + α (By Fact. A.3)
= (1 + µ)qiℓτ ,ℓτ+1 + α
Thus, both the upper and lower bounds on the estimator hold with probability 1− δ.
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Proof of Lemma 3.3. We will show each of the three parts to be true.
1. We start by proving that Intervals will output a partition with at most 24nLβγ intervals. We claim
that each interval is at least βγ24nL in length, implying the above bound on the total number of intervals.
Consider some current upper bound for an interval ℓτ+1. If Intervals accepts some point ℓτ such
that ℓτ+1 − ℓτ ≥
βγ
24nL , then the bound trivially holds.
If this does not hold, Intervals tests some point ℓ̂τ such that
βγ
24nL
≥ ℓτ+1 − ℓ̂τ ≥
βγ
48nL
since it is doing binary search. We claim Intervals will accept ℓ̂τ ; if this is the case, the interval will
have length at least βγ48nL . Notice that
P[max
j
bj ∈ [ℓ̂τ , ℓτ+1]|max
j
bj ≤ ℓτ+1]] ≤ P[max
j
bj ∈ [ℓτ+1 −
βγ
24nL
, ℓτ+1]|max
j
bj ≤ ℓτ+1]]
so it will suffice to show that Intervals would accept the smallest possible value of ℓ̂τ (since that
region will have the most probability mass). We bound the ratio, for a given ℓτ+1 such that
P[max
j
bj ∈ [ℓτ+1 −
βγ
24nL
, ℓτ+1]|max
j
bj ≤ ℓτ+1] =
P[maxj bj ≤ ℓτ+1 −
βγ
24nL ]
P[maxj bj ≤ ℓτ+1]
for some upper point of an interval ℓτ+1 such that P[i wins with a bid ≤ ℓτ+1] ≥ γ. Since Fj is
L-Lipschitz for all j,
P[bj ≤ ℓτ+1]− P[bj ≤ ℓτ+1 −
βγ
24nL
] ≤ L
βγ
24Ln
=
βγ
24n
.
Then, by summing this probability over all n bidders, we have
P[max
j
bj ≤ ℓτ+1]− P[max
j
bj ≤ ℓτ+1 −
βγ
24nL
] ≤
βγ
24
.
Rearranging terms, we have
P[maxj bj ≤ ℓτ+1 −
βγ
24nL ]
P[maxj bj ≤ ℓτ+1]
≥ 1−
β′γ
P[maxj bj ≤ ℓτ+1]
≥ 1−
β
24
where the last inequality came from the fact that P[i wins with a bid ≤ ℓτ+1] ≥ P[maxj bj ≤ ℓτ+1] ≥ γ.
So, Intervals will accept ℓ̂τ as ℓτ , so long as the empirical estimate of Inside is correct up to
α+ µ = β48 , which is the case by Corollary A.2 with probability 1− 3δ
′.
2. We now need to show
P[max
j
bj ≥ ℓτ−1|max
j
bj ≤ ℓτ ] ≤
β
16
holds for the lattice points t > 3. Since P[maxj bj ≤ ℓ3] ≥ γ, by Corollary A.2, the accuracy guarantee
holds with probability 1− 3δ′ for a fixed t (since α = β
2
96 , µ =
β
96 , and the condition by which ℓτ−1 was
accepted was that the empirical estimate of the above quantity was at most β24 ). Thus, with probability
1− 3kδ′, the above holds for all t > 3.
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3. We begin by showing P[maxj bj ≤ ℓ2] ≤ γ with probability at least 1− δ
′. The condition for stopping
the search for new interval points is
J =
∑
t∈S1
I[i wins on sample t]
T
≤
γ
2
where S1 is a random sample of size T with reserve ℓ1. A basic Chernoff bound shows that
P[|J − P[max
j
bj ≤ ℓ1]| ≥
γ
2
] ≤ 2e−
Tγ2
2
which, for T =
32 ln 6
δ′
α2γ2µ2 is at most δ
′, so PS1 [P[maxj bj ≤ ℓ2] ≤ γ] ≥ 1− δ
′, as desired.
It remains to sum up the total error probability and sample complexity. The lower bound on the length
of each interval also implies a bound on the total number of empirical estimates made to find a fixed
ℓτ . Formally, the halving algorithm beginning with a search space of size ℓτ+1 ≤ 1 will halt before the
remaining search space has shrunk to βγ48Ln , which will take at most log
48Ln
βγ = log(k) attempted interval
endpoints per accepted interval endpoint. Each of these attempts calls Inside, which takes 2 estimates.
For each accepted interval, an estimate of the remaining probability mass is done. Thus, in total, there are
2k log(k) + k estimates done by Intervals. Each fails with probability at most δ′, so Intervals succeeds
with probability at least 1− 3k log(k)δ′ and uses at most 3k log(k)T samples.
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